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Terrorism, whether it is group-related or performed as lone actor terrorism, is a predominantly male phenomenon.
Generally and throughout history, young males have been the main protagonists of criminal and political violence.
This article aims to contribute, from different perspecives, to the question of what makes young men violent. These
include neurobiological aspects, such as sex differences in the brain that predispose males to physical aggression and
violence; gender role aspects, with regard to aggression and violence being basic components for demonstrating and
reconstructing masculinity; demographic aspects of male youth bulges as potential breeding grounds for terrorism;
aspects of group dynamics and identity fusion in the process of radicalization; and psychosocial characteristics of lone
actor terrorists, which differ from group-related terrorists.
It is concluded that in addition to ideological, political, economic, regional, demographic, or psychosocial causes,
experiences of threatened masculinity may be an underlying factor and driving force for terrorism.
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Terrorism—Some Principal Aspects
Terrorism is a highly contested concept. It includes
numerous different national, academic, and political
definitions; however, for decades a legal definition was
missing. A first consensus has recently been achieved by
the General Assembly of the United Nations:
Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine
about the presumed effectiveness of a special form
or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political
violence and, on the other hand, to a conspira-
tional practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct
violent action without legal or moral restraints,
targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants,
performed for its propagandistic and psychological
effects on various audiences and conflict parties.1
The doctrine may be based on fundamentalist political or
religious ideologies that legitimize all kinds of violence.
For example, Islamic extremism names all non-Muslims
and even liberal Muslims as infidels, who must be killed
until there is no other religion left but the “true faith.”
Terrorism as coercive political violence may be
employed by illegal state repression or by nonstate actors;
the latter may act in small groups or diffuse transnational
networks, but increasingly also as single actors (“lone-wolf”
terrorism). This has been described as the changing face of
terrorism in the 21st century.2 Lone-wolf attackers are
meanwhile the main perpetrators of terrorist activity in
Western societies, mainly in the US, but recently also in
France and Germany, causing 70% of all deaths caused by
terrorists over the past 10 years.Half of all attacksworldwide
with a connection to the so-called Islamic State (also known
as ISIS or ISIL) have been conducted by lone actors.3
However, Islamic fundamentalism is not the main driver of
terrorism in Western countries; lone-wolf terrorists also
have been inspired by political extremism, nationalism, and
racial and religious supremacy (eg, the case of far-right
terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, who committed the 2011
Norway attacks and killed 77 persons).
The direct victims of terror attacks are not the
ultimate target but serve as message generators: the
attack is documented by online social media platforms
and mass media, which further reinforces the terrorists’
focus on public attention, public fear, and intimidation,
as well as effects of propaganda for their message and
recruitment of potential terrorists. For instance, online
publishing of filmed beheadings by Al Qaeda have been
intended to serve as a display of power and enactment.
Similarly, theWorld Trade Center assault in New York on
September 11, 2001, can be considered as a perverse
performance of omnipotence and the power to cause
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chaos, confusion, and fear, not primarily to legitimize a
political ideology.4
Terrorism is a highly complex phenomenon shaped by
political and socio-economic conditions, as well as by
ethnic and ideological conflicts and their history,
demographic characteristics, regional segregation, and
access to weapons.
There are 2 distinct sets of factors associated with
terrorism depending on the developmental status of the
country. Between 1989 and 2014, 93% of all terrorist
attacks occurred in countries with high levels of
state-sponsored terror.3 Depending on the level of
development, factors such as youth unemployment,
militarization, levels of criminality, or distrust in the
electoral process can be statistically identified as corre-
lates of terrorism in Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD)-affiliated coun-
tries. In developing countries, factors such as the history
of conflict, levels of corruption, acceptance of the human
rights, and group-based inequalities are more significantly
related to terrorist activity.3 As measured by the Global
Terrorism Index, countries with the highest rate of
terrorism are Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and
Syria. The most active and global terror groups are ISIL
(Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), Boko Haram, the
Taliban, and Al Qaeda.
Especially since 2014, increased Islamic terrorist activity
in Europe can be observed. This increase can be related to
spill-over effects of the Syrian Civil War, to the so-called
“Iraq effect” caused by the US war under President Bush
against Iraq,5 and to the European continuing migrant
crisis, which facilitates the infiltration of terrorists. As one
consequence of the upsurge of ISIS/ISIL and of millions of
incoming refugees, there is a rise not only of anti-Muslim
attitudes in Europe,6 but also an increase of anti-
immigration and Islamophobic violence as well as militant,
right-wing extremist groups. The upsurge of ISIL is further
due to the fact that it has successfully begun to use Europe as
a new recruitment base for potential terrorists, even though
it has lost ground in the Middle East.
In fact, from 2012 to 2015, more than 400 people left
Belgium for ISIL-controlled Iraq and Syria, and nearly
1,200 left France to join jihad terrorism.7 The European
Police Agency Europol estimates that more than 5,000
Europeans have left to join Islamist fighters in Syria, and
the problem for security services is aggravated when
these people return with training and a mission.8 In
Germany, for example, 550 potentially violent attackers
have been identified.
When estimating the current terrorist threat in
Western societies, Renard8 states “that it is very serious,
even increasing, but not existential” (p. 7). Statistically,
people would have a higher chance of dying from a car
accident, or falling off their bed or a ladder than dying
from terrorism.
Terrorism Is a Man’s Business
As is obvious from the introduction, violence is a
multicausal behavior and has been subject to various
disciplines with a variety of somewhat controversial
theories. However, a fact more than apparent is that
physical violence, whether it is individual or collective,
such as wars, armed conflicts, genocides, or terrorism, is
a predominantly male phenomenon. Generally and
throughout history, young males have been the main
protagonists of criminal as well as political violence.
However, gender is widely ignored in terrorism and
violence research. Where it is addressed, it refers mainly
to women, not to men, because the latter are held to be
the “norm” of violent behavior, so self-evident that
further explanation is not needed. This article focuses
on violent youngmales from different perspectives.What
makes men violent? A comprehensive approach to better
understand this phenomenon includes neurobiological,
psychological, and social factors that increase the risk of
violence under certain societal conditions. These factors
will also contribute to the question of why especially
young males become radicalized and why they are prone
to violent extremist groups.
Neurobiological Predispositions for Male Violence
Gender is an issue of nature and nurture. Maleness,
respectively, masculinity is not solely a sociocultural
construct, as many social scientists still believe, but is
also shaped by sex differences in brain structure and
function, stress response, and genetics. That does not
mean that males are “hardwired” for violence, but it does
mean that they may be more disposed to aggression and
violence than females.9,10 Numerous examples of sex
differences in the brain, in brain regions and circuits,
have been documented that are relevant regarding
violent behavior. In addition, a mutation of monoamine
oxidase A (MAOA), a gene encoding enzyme responsible
for the breakdown of the neurotransmitters norepinephr-
ine, serotonin, and dopamine, has been proven that
makes affected males more disposed to antisocial and
violent behavior, especially when they had experienced
maltreatment or neglect in their childhood.9,11 With
regard to brain structure, the volume of the male
amygdala (center of emotion processing) is larger
compared to that of females, whereas the orbitofrontal
cortex, which controls negative emotions emerging from
the amygdala, is smaller. As brain researchers conclude,
males may be less able to regulate negative emotions and
so may be more prone to impulsive behavior.12 With
respect to neurotransmitters, data indicate that low
levels of serotonin may reinforce aggressiveness, impul-
sivity, and risk-taking behavior in males, especially in
stressful situations.13–15 While women under stress may
120 A. M. MÖLLER-LEIMKÜHLER
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1092852917000438
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UB der LMU München, on 25 Sep 2019 at 08:14:43, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
be protected by estrogen and oxytocin, and may respond
with prosocial strategies such as communication and
help-seeking, men tend to respond with a higher release
of cortisol and testosterone, which is associated with the
fight or flight response, particularly when they feel
threatened in their social status.16 Unlike in animal
studies, testosterone in human males may not be directly
associated with physical aggression, but rather with
social dominance. Males with high testosterone, when
viewing angry faces, display less activation of the
amygdala than those with low testosterone, which
indicates that they feel less threatened by the anger of
others.17 Furthermore, an association with delinquent
and violent behavior has been found in late adolescent
males.12 Specifically in their early adolescence, males are
experiencing an excessive rise of testosterone, driving
them to aggressive, risk-taking behavior and sensation-
seeking, which is significantly reinforced by peers.18
Risky behavior in adolescents seems also to be triggered
by a specific heightened sensitivity of the dopaminergic
reward system (“no risk, no fun”). However, risky
behavior does not guarantee rewards, but may as well
have negative outcomes, the worst of which is increased
mortality due to suicides, traffic accidents, unintentional
self-injuries, and violence.19 This is partly due to an
imbalance of brain maturing in adolescent males, with
the orbitofrontal cortex maturing later and more slowly
(about 2 years later compared to females), while the
amygdala/the limbic regions develop earlier and more
quickly, probably impacting rational or moral decision
making.20
With highly professional media marketing strategies,
explicitly focusing on heroism and adventure (similar to
Hollywood scripts21,22), ISIL is targeting mainly adoles-
cent males, whose identity is typically fragile and
malleable in their teenage years. Longing for purpose
and adventure, young males may be particularly suscep-
tible to ISIL’s promises (money, guns, and girls). In
addition, throughout history rebellion against the estab-
lishment (family, school, state, church) has always been a
strong motivator in young males.
Recently it has been reported that even underaged and
unaccompanied boys who are caught up in refugee camps
in Germany are the new target of radical Salafists (an ultra-
conservative movement within Sunni Islam).23 These
traumatized, vulnerable children undergoing indoctrina-
tion are extremely susceptible to brain damage, as basic
social, emotional, and cognitive neuronal networks are
laid down in childhood.
Masculinity and Violence
Maleness is not only based on biology, but also on socio-
historical constructions of what it means to bemale, which
may be different in different cultures (and subcultures) and
different times. However, in most societies, hegemonic
masculinity24 has established patriarchal gender hierar-
chies. The traditional ideal of masculinity, stereotypically
associated with action, dominance, achievement, power,
competition, autonomy, pain tolerance, endurance, and
independence, has been challenged currently, especially
by younger generations. However, (adolescent) males may
cope with an insecure identity, feelings of emasculization,
inter- or intragender competition, grievances or experi-
ences of social disintegration, and anxiety or hopelessness
with exaggerated traditional masculinity norms. One of
the most influential archetypes of masculinity is the
fighter, respectively, the hero (others are the breadwinner
or the rebel), eg, the superhero as presented in computer
games and films, or the man-of-action hero, a specifically
American ideal, which may manifest itself in symbolic
everyday consumption, when opportunities to gain and
demonstrate power and status have been reduced in our
postindustrial times.25
Aggression and violence are basic components of these
masculinity ideals, and are legitimized as they aid in
building and rebuilding social order (as is also supported
by evolutionary explanations). For this reason, aggression
and violence are at the same time principle means to
demonstrate and reconstruct masculinity.
In the face of numerous rites of passage from boyhood
to manhood in many preindustrial countries, theorists of
various disciplines suppose that unlike womanhood,
manhood is a precarious social status because it is
relatively difficult to earn, but easy to lose. It is not a
state of being, but rather a status that is conferred by
others, particular other males.26 Becoming and remain-
ing a “real man” entails suffering, proving, and fighting for
social acceptance. Male identity seems particularly
precarious in individuals with a high mental vulnerability
due to experiencing stress in childhood, such as family
violence, broken home, absence of the father, abuse, or
other traumatization.Masculinity is a status that is earned
and maintained primarily by actions and achievements,
not somuch by enduring personal attributes.27 Thus, risk-
taking physical behavior, including aggression and
violence, is perceived as a way for males to demonstrate
masculinity, particularly when it has been threatened.
Extremists, whether they are right-wing extremists or
Islam extremists, share the perception that the world is
perishing because their fundamentalist political/religious
values are threatened by dominating Western ideologies
of democracy, gender equality, and open society. Thus, it
is not astonishing that these ideologies are linked to
ultraconservative ideals of masculinity, as demonstrated
in their propaganda, messages, and symbols. These ideals
play an important part in young males’ search for identity,
leading them to believe that joining right-wing extremists
would be a masculine rite of passage.28 Masculinity
becomes a kind of hypermasculinity that includes a
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narrowly defined, exaggerated, and violence-oriented
image of the warrior.28 Thus, young men have to prove
their maleness in violent acts, with violence and combat
as the only medium available where real masculinity can
be acquired and verified.
This notion of hypermasculinity refers to the broader
historical link between masculinity and the military,
which has been constructed for the purpose of waging
wars and is well documented, eg, by militarized
masculinity in World Wars I and II. By equating military
requirements with male values such as toughness,
courage, honor, and willpower, violence becomes legit-
imized, normalized, and even glamorized, and thus is
transferred into the self-concept. This instrumentaliza-
tion of a unidimensional construct of masculinity,
together with the Nazi ideology and visions of “Great
Germany,” might be one explanation for the ruthless
violence conducted by German soldiers. Narratives of
German soldiers who fought in World Wars I or II29
illustrate how intensely soldiers had internalized those
expectations of hardness and ruthlessness to prove their
masculinity and to avoid being emasculated for showing
empathy for the enemy. The stronger their adaptation to
martial masculinity, the better they were able to suppress
their emotions, fears, scruples, and suffering. There is
also evidence from secret recordings of conversations
made by the British intelligence on German prisoners of
war that some soldiers might have even enjoyed their
killing and atrocities towards civilians; at the very least,
some boasted about their actions.30 Militarized mascu-
linity is one important cornerstone, not only for the war
machinery, but also for the soldiers’ experiences, their
social roles, and their coping strategies. It might be seen
as a complex defense mechanism in order to protect the
self from traumatic experiences, and possibly as a
(dysfunctional) way to cope with guilt.
Even today the soldier/warrior remains a key symbol
of masculinity,31 and militarized masculinity remains
central to the perpetuation of violence in international
relations.32
Coming back to Islamic terrorism, the fighter is
simultaneously the sacred warrior who dies a martyr and
is declared a hero both before and after his death.
Monetary awards and support provided to the families of
suicide bombers and other martyrs serves to reinforce
the value and glamor of these extremely violent acts.33
Due to the fact that Islamic culture is a culture of honor,
manhood and honor are closely related; they are even
synonymous.34 Men are also viewed as owners and
protectors of the women’s honor in their families. They
must protect their reputations and those of their
families, even with violence when necessary, because
dishonor means shame and emasculation. Thus, in
cultures of honor, masculinity is even more precarious
with perceived insults evoking aggression and violent
behavior to restore manhood. In Islamic extremism,
male honor can be only found in the role as warrior
whereas female honor is found in the home.
Taken together, right-wing and Islamic extremism/
terrorism are based on common notions of archaic
masculinity, which are perceived to be threatened and
may result in terroristic actions to restore culture and
manhood.
To give an individual example, an alternative view of
the right-wing terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, who
committed the 2011 Norway attacks and killed 77 young
people, may demonstrate the driving forces of his
bombing and shooting on the island Utoya: perceived
Islamification, perceived breakdown of male dominance,
and sexual liberation.35 Based on his analyses of the key
documents of the case, Richards has supposed that
Breivik’s (unconscious) core fear was emasculation, an
attack on his masculine identity arising from changes in
society. “In this polemic, the fusion of feminism,
feminization, matriarchy, androgyny and homosexuality
threatens to engulf the Christian European heterosexual
male, the hero of history who is now an object of
contempt and hatred. It is here that Breivik’s choice of
Utoya as his target can be understood” (p. 45).35 Breivik’s
fantasies focused on re-establishing the medieval mili-
tary order of the Knights Templar with grandiose ideas of
omnipotence and restoration. According to Richards,
“Breivik arrived at the island in a homemade police
uniform to put an end to their sexual free-for-all, and to
reassert the heroic figure of the patriarchal male who
offers exemplary resistance to the tide of soft, corrupting
pleasure that is washing over his civilization and
dissolving its core categories” (p. 45).35
Youth Bulges, Economic Stagnation, and Terrorism
Some years ago, the cover of the German weekly
magazine Der Spiegel declared in large type: “Young
men: The world´s most dangerous species.”36 Of course
this is an inadequate generalization. Although violent
crimes and terroristic attacks are mostly committed by
young males aged between 15 and 25, violence is a rather
rare event on the individual level: in Germany, for
example, about 2% of young men of this age are
suspected to have committed one or more violent
crimes.37 But what about disproportional cohorts of
adolescent males who live mainly in Islamic countries
and become involved in terrorism? What makes young
men susceptible to violence and terrorism from a macro-
level perspective? As the link between terrorism, types of
terrorism, and social/societal conditions in different
countries is extremely complex, it is not possible to
identify common causes to explain terrorism as a general
phenomenon.38 However, regarding the evolution of
Islamic terrorism in developing countries, several main
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causes have been described: centuries of colonization,
weakness of the state, political exclusion and social
inequality, economic stagnation or decline, and negative
effects of globalization. These factors are often cumula-
tive and interacting, so that any mobilization for a
peaceful change seems rather impossible.39 Thus,
poverty and humiliation play important roles, but are
not single causes of terrorism, as often has been argued.
What has been also discussed is the question of whether
the demographic explosion of so-called youth bulges,
defined as large cohorts of young males aged 15–24
relative to the total adult population (over 20%), are a
breeding ground for violence and terrorism.40 Given a
declining or stagnating economy in numerous Muslim
societies (eg, Middle East, Africa, parts of Asia) with high
rates of unemployment, many young men, mostly born
after 1980, lacking the perspective that comes with age
but with a lot of free time, feel humiliated and margin-
alized without any opportunities to prove themselves as
honorable and masculine in culturally prescribed ways.41
Empirical evidence suggests an association between
youth bulges and increased risk for political or terrorist
violence, especially when economic opportunities are
reduced and levels of education are low, but also in cases
when highly educated young males do not find adequate
jobs. It is not by chance that young engineers are
overrepresented among Islamic terrorists in the Muslim
countries, as Gambetta and Hertog42 found in their study
on the correlation between extremism and education in
Muslim countries. In their analysis of data regarding 497
members of extremist groups, they concluded that, aside
from a specific mind-set typical for engineers the main
reason for joining a terrorist group is experiencing
frustrated expectations and relative deprivation:
engineering is one of the most prestigious subjects, with
high entry requirements inMuslim countries, thus young
students expect corresponding high-status employment
after graduation. However, because of economic devel-
opment failures in North Africa and the Middle East,
such high-status opportunities are extremely rare. These
young engineers thus experience a large dissonance
between merit and reward, which contributes to their
radicalization. Interestingly, Gambetta and Hertog42 did
not find an overrepresentation of engineers among
terrorists in the West, in Singapore, or in Saudi Arabia,
where graduates have far better professional opportu-
nities. (In these areas Islamic terrorism has attracted
more marginal males with lower education.)
To conclude, it is not that relatively large cohorts of
young males are dangerous per se, but they may become
dangerous under the conditions of low, respectfully,
expanding education and concurrent economic
stagnation, which restrain “doing” masculinity within
cultural standards and gaining social acceptance. If such
opportunities do not exist, political or religious violence,
whether individual or collective, may serve as a powerful
alternative for living without “male” achievements.
Thus, most vulnerable to terrorist agitation are
well-educated young men who are frustrated about the
lack of opportunities in the developing countries in
which they live.43
Another picture emerges, for example, in East
Germany, where another bulge of young men comprises
a new lower class in remote regions. Despite the
reunification of West and East Germany in 1989, the
eastern regions have remained less developed economic-
ally, with higher rates of unemployment, especially
among young males. While many better education young
women left for West Germany to improve their career
options, young men, particularly from rural areas,
remained in their home regions. For these young men,
who are less educated and are unemployed, migrating to
West Germany to find better jobs is not a realistic option.
Also, due to the migration of young women, finding a
mate and starting a family are difficult for young males,
as in some regions the population of females aged 18–34
is down by 25%.44 Economic restructuring, lack of
education, and lack of adaptation have contributed not
only to increasing violent criminality among males, but
also to the rising attraction of far-right extremist groups
that celebrate hyper-masculine, anti-feminist, anti-demo-
cratic, and racist ideologies. One of the reasons may be
that young men perceive a profound devaluation of the
traditional male gender role, including physical labor and
breadwinning, because traditional male jobs in crafts,
manufacturing, and construction (not requiring better
education and being highly respected in the former
German Democratic Republic) now have been severely
affected by structural change of the economy and have lost
importance.45 Given that many young men are poorly
educated, have low income or are unemployed, and are
without opportunity to start a family, they feel disadvan-
taged and emasculated, and may long for a revaluation of
“genuine” masculinity.
Not surprisingly, the number of right-wing extremists
in Germany has increased from 21,000 in 2014 to 22,600
in 2016, with half of them being regarded as violence
oriented.46 Respectively, there has been a continuous
and dramatic increase of right-wing extremist violence in
the last few years. From 2014 to 2015, the number of
violent offenses increased by 44%, and refugee shelters
were the predominant target (901 violent attacks out of
1005 total attacks).
Group Dynamics and Identity Fusion
There is a consensus among terrorist experts that
psychological explanations of terrorism at the individual
level are not sufficient. In order to best explain terrorist
behavior, group psychology must be applied, with a
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particular focus on collective identity. This is all the
more important because a unique psychopathological,
psychological, or social profile for terrorists could not be
derived from biographical analyses.2,47,48
Male alliances have always been the dominant unit in
competitive public arenas, such as science, economy,
sports, religion, secret societies, police, military, and
politics—in particular political violence. Terrorists
operate conventionally in groups/organizations; men-
tally unstable individuals are screened out, because they
represent a security risk.2 Generally, 90% of all violent
attacks by young males are performed in groups. This is
because violence is a constitutive component in
aggression-prone groups, which render putative status
and power to the individual member. Furthermore, male
groups are functional for males in general, as they are the
key sites where masculinity is defined, proved, per-
formed, and reconstructed.49
Searching for the roots of group violence, evolutionary
theory suggests that living in groups is beneficial for the
surviving of certain species (humans, primates, or rats),
especially under conditions of limited resources (food,
territory), which are embattled by rival male subgroups.
Discriminating, attacking, casting out, or killing indivi-
duals belonging to the same species, but not to same
group, seems to be a phylogenetic heritage, as has been
manifested in countless wars and battles, as well as
numerous genocides, throughout history. This phenom-
enon has been referred to by social psychology as
intergroup conflict or minimal group paradigm.50 It is
based on a profound evolutionary pattern of belonging to
one group and separating from others with regard to
differences such as ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural,
or national. As Tajfel51 has demonstrated in experimental
studies, separation into groups can occur even on
minimal, arbitrary, and meaningless differences that
trigger intergroup discrimination; identity with a group
is based solely on group membership, respectively, social
categorization. On the individual level, being part of a
group (eg, genetic, cultural, ideological) and identifying
with the group’s goals, values, and norms constitute a
sense of social identity, pride, and self-esteem. Over-
valuing the own group (“we”) and devaluating the out-
group (“they”) results in an increased self-image of the
group members and subsequently an increased group
cohesiveness. Social identity theory states that the more
strongly a member identifies with the group, the stronger
his social identity will be, but the more his personal
identity will fade. He will become a puppet. However, this
idea generates new questions. Are puppets able to
sacrifice themselves for their group? Were the soldiers
of the Nazi regime puppets without personal identity? It is
possible that extreme pro-group behavior, like suicide
bombing or mass murder, may not be fully explained by
this approach.
Based on social identity theory, a more sophisticated
explanation has been developed by Swann et al.,52,53 who
put forward the concept of “identity fusion.” Identity
fusion occurs in different degrees due to a visceral feeling
of oneness with the group, while personal identity is
retained and channeled into pro-group action. In addition
to the synergetic connection of personal and collective
identity, the perception of the group as a family is crucial
for motivation. Highly fused group members cultivate
close ties to other group members, as well as to the group
as a whole. Thus, it is not surprising that actors whose
personal identity is highly fused within a unique collective
identity would kill and die for the sake of their collective
when it is threatened, because they perceive the bonds as
family-like. In-depth case and field studies of terrorist
groups by the anthropologist Scott Atran54,55 suggest that
“people almost never kill and die (just) for the cause, but
for each other: for their group, whose cause makes their
imagined family of genetic strangers—their brotherhood,
fatherland, motherland, homeland” (p. 33).54
Due to the dangers and costs of participation in
terrorism, terrorist groups are more tight-knit than
other voluntary associations. Obviously, this may be one
of the most attractive factors for potential terrorists.
There is evidence from interviews with terrorists that
many join violent groups seeking challenges and excite-
ment, but above all they seek friendship and fellowship.
These motives seem more important to them than the
political purpose or ideology of their collective.5
Such non-ideological motivations are also supported
for right-wing extremists.56–58 From a perspective of
social disintegration,59 right-wing violence among
young males can best be explained as a consequence of
deficits in fundamental recognition needs. It is a sort of
projective coping of individual deficits perceived as
being caused by others. Ideology often serves as a
justification of violent acts.
Lone-Wolf Terrorists Are Different
Lone-wolf terrorists prepare and commit violent acts
alone, without command structure or material assistance
from terrorist groups/organizations. Nevertheless, they
may be influenced or motivated by terrorist groups, and
may act in support of these groups. Although lone-wolf
terrorism is rare, it has been a historical, and now
increasing, phenomenon in the US and Europe, being
inspired not only by ISIL but also by far-right extremism.
It is argued that the surge of lone-wolf terrorism is due to
pressure from security services forcing a tactical adapta-
tion, and terrorist groups, particularly ISIL, who call on
those who share their ideology to act alone without
direction or support.60 The Internet has made it easier
than ever before to distribute and find radicalizing
material and instructions on how to conduct attacks.61
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The profile of lone actors has proven to be rather
heterogeneous, while the only common factor is being
male.62 Political or religious ideology seems not to be the
only motivation for their attacks, but personal grievances
also contribute. Current research on lone actor terrorists
indicates that they differ significantly from members of
terrorist groups; they seem to have much more in
common with apolitical mass murderers or school
shooters,63 as they tend to combine their personal
grievances and frustrations with religious or political
ideologies.64 This is a commonality that distinguishes lone
actors from organized terrorists who share collective
grievances. However, because of the complex constella-
tion of contributing factors in each case, it is not possible
to identify a unique psychological profile of the typical
lone-wolf terrorist. Decades of research have attempted to
find such unique explanations,65 starting with psycho-
pathological approaches in the 1970s (mostly speculations
based on anecdotal observations) followed by psycho-
analytic approaches during the 1980s, with particular
emphasis on narcissism. In the 1990s and 2000s, these
approaches have been dismissed due to methodological
and empirical reasons, while group dynamics, based on
improved data collection and primary interviews with
terrorists, became the new dominating concept to under-
stand terrorist motivation in general. However, in the face
of increasing lone-wolf terrorism, group dynamics cannot
be a sufficient explanation, even though lone attackers
may have self-radicalized via Internet propaganda of
terrorist groups and may perceive themselves as members
of a virtual community. Consequently, previously dis-
missed mental health and personality factors must be
revisited on the basis of the existing empirical evidence,
while extreme positions must be questioned (“they are all
mentally ill” or “a terrorist cannot be mentally ill”65). For
example, with respect to mental illness, it has often been
argued thatmental illness is the primary reason for violent
behavior, and that a mentally ill person is not able to
rationally plan violent attacks. However, it has been
shown that lone-actor terrorists diagnosed with mental
illness frequently display rational motivations65 and are
capable of sophisticated attack planning.66 In fact, mental
health problems are significantly more common in lone-
actor terrorists compared to group-based terrorists.67,68
Corner and Gill67 also support the role of social isolation
in lone actors, as they found that 53% of lone actors
were socially isolated; however, this isolation was due
to a recent interpersonal conflict rather than a chronic
state. Other authors emphasize that, while lone wolves
physically isolate themselves from society, they simulta-
neously seek recognition for their causes through spoken
statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages,
texting, and videotaped proclamations.64
As quantitative and qualitative analyses of lone-actor
terrorists indicate, unsolved psychosocial problems may
play an important role in self-radicalizing and conducting
terroristic attacks, as is also true for school shooters. Both
lone actors and school shooters perceive themselves as
outsiders and are unable to accept defeat or to cope with
cumulative disappointment, and so they end up in a state
of chronic frustration and aggression.69,70
Some sociologists have claimed that searching for
reasons and contributing factors to explain violence and
terror would legitimize and victimize the perpetrators
while ignoring their main motivation: experiencing total
power over their victims, feeling omnipotent, and being a
hero and avenger. However, this is no contradiction.
Whether lone-actor terrorist, school shooter, or group-
related terrorist, they belong to the “laughing killer”
type.71 According to Theweleit, “they are men who enjoy
their murderous game, who see themselves as part of a
higher power that condones all of this. They laugh as they
celebrate the sanctioned crime, their unpunished, godlike
actions.”72 Anders Breivik, theNorwegianmassmurderer,
burst into ecstatic laughter during his killing spree, and
was relaxed and smiling during the trial. So did others: the
killer of Orlando, when he shooted in the head of his
wounded victims next to him, the killer of Dallas, of
Charleston, North Carolina, or the killers of Bataclan,
Paris, who apparently enjoyed their atrocity.
With respect to sociodemographic characteristics of
lone shooters, the existing literature indicates no
consistent evidence of economic disadvantage or poorer
education compared to the general population, but
points to a higher rate of unemployment.62 Obviously,
there seem to be differences depending on the different
ideologies. Compared to Islamist lone actor terrorists,
right-wing lone actors have a lower education, and are
often unemployed, single, and have never been married.
In sum, sociodemographic data at best demonstrate
the variability of terrorists’ backgrounds. In the words of
Adam Deen, an ex-Jihadi and now counter-terrorist
outreach worker in London: “The predominant factor
in radicalisation is the ideology [of Islam]—it is the ideas
that move people. I didn’t come from a poverty-stricken
background or broken home. I went to university, I didn’t
feel angry and I was apolitical. Yet, I was indoctrinated
with a radical Islamist ideology and became impassioned
with the idea of an Islamic state.”73
Conclusions
In the face of the multiple factors likely associated with
terrorism, it is obvious that there exists no unique
“master explanation.”Research can only offer approaches
to understanding terrorism from a variety of perspec-
tives, thus producing even more complexity.
Nevertheless, clear answers are needed for many
reasons, not the least of which is practical approaches to
counterterrorism. Thus, in political and public debates,
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different explanations regarding root causes (necessary
and sufficient causes) have been favored. One popular
“master explanation” has been humiliation, as Islamic
terrorists themselves, and also terrorism experts, have
claimed humiliation to be a motivating force. According to
the historian Goldhagen,74 there are, however, many
historical examples in non-Middle Eastern countries where
humiliation did not result in devastating terror. This means
that there is no deterministic link between humiliation and
terror on the macro-social level, just as there is no
deterministic link between frustration and aggression/
violence on the micro-social level, as was supposed by early
aggression theory. Of course, real or perceived humiliation
and frustration are playing important roles, but what
significantly triggers violence in this context is the
connection with fundamentalist political-religious ideas of
a better world that shape political goals and result in
destructive power politics and terror. This is a continuous
pattern throughout history and may reflect an anthro-
pological matter of fact. Numerous historical examples
show how men and unidimensional notions of masculinity
have been instrumentalized for political violence by
propagating individual significance as a hero, avenger, or
warrior in the name of God or for any goal greater than
oneself. From a gender perspective, humiliation can also
be understood as a sense of being emasculated—by the
West, women, their fathers, culture, migrants, globaliza-
tion, or peers. As has been shown, masculinity is a
precarious status that must be continuously performed,
reassured, and proved. Joining collective terrorism, as
well as acting alone, offers perceived opportunities to
re-establish and validate masculinity, however in exagger-
ated forms of destructive hypermasculinity.
To conclude, in addition to ideological, political,
economic, regional, demographic, or psychological
causes contributing to terrorism, experiences of threa-
tened masculinity may be an underlying factor and
driving force that contribute to better understanding of
collective and lone actor terrorism.
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